A Judicial Challenge To The Sec\u27S
Shareholder Proposal Rule by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 7
Spring 3-1-1971
A Judicial Challenge To The Sec'S Shareholder
Proposal Rule
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




A JUDICIAL CHALLENGE TO THE SEC'S
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 14a-81-the rule
providing for inclusion in management's proxy solicitation material of
shareholders' proposals for corporate action-has had an uneventful
judiciary history. Despite adverse reaction by some commentators to
what they have seen as unnecessary restrictions on shareholders' initia-
tive,2 the courts have rarely been called on to construe Rule 14a-8; and
when the rule has come before them, the Commission has been given
virtually a free hand in its construction.3 But the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Medical Committee
for Human Rights v. SEC4 suggests that this history of judicial defer-
ence to the agency's interpretation of its rule may be coming to an end.
While the court remanded the case for further administrative pro-
ceedings without reaching the merits, it added several pages of dictum
taking issue with the SEC's position in sufficiently vigorous language
to place the future of Rule 14a-8 in considerable doubt.5
If the Commission's interpretation of the shareholder proposal rule
is indeed overruled as a result of this litigation, it can be recorded as a
casualty of the war in Vietnam. The case arose when the Medical Com-
mittee for Human Rights, the holder of five shares of Dow Chemical
Company stock,6 requested Dow's management to include a proposal
in its 1969 proxy statement. The proposed resolution urged the board
of directors to consider the advisibility of amending the company's
117 C.F.R. § 24o.14a-8 (1970).
FE.g., Bayne, The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U. DET. L.J. 575 (1957);
Bayne, Caplin, Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making Pro-
cess: The z954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REV. 387 (1954); Emerson, Some Sociological
and Legal Aspects of Institutional and Individual Participation Under the SEC's
Shareholder Proposal Rule, 34 U. DEr. L.J. 528, 547 (1957).
5See, e.g., Dyer v. SEC, 290 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1961); Dyer v. SEC, 289 F.2d 242
(8th Cir. 1961); Dyer v. SEC. 287 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1961); Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33
(8th Cir. 1959); Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 81o (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Curtin
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 19'7 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Peck v. Greyhound
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
'432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. ig7o).
rId at 676-82.
6These shares were transferred to the Medical Committee on March 22, 1968.
Letter from William A. Groening, Jr. to Herbert H. Dow, January 29, 197o, at-
tached to Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Dis-
pense with Oral Argument as Exhibit A.
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certificate of incorporation to prevent the company from making
napalm.7
Not surprisingly, management viewed this proposal unfavorably
and notified the Commission of its intention to omit it from the proxy
material. In support of this decison, the company filed a letter and
memorandum opinion of counsel setting forth its objections to the
proposal.8 The Commission's Division of Corporate Finance accepted
Dow's reasoning, prompting a request from the Medical Committee
for review of the Division's decision by the full Commission.9
The Commission, after filing of argument by both sides, informed
the parties that it had approved the recommendation of the Division
of Corporate Finance that no action be taken if the proposal were
omitted by the company.10 The Medical Committee thereupon peti-
tioned the court of appeals for review of the Commission's action un-
der Section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11
1432 F.2d at 63. The text of the proposed resolution was as follows:
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of the Dow Chemical Company
request that the Board of Directors, in accordance with the laws
[sic] of the Dow Chemical Company, consider the advisability of
adopting a resolution setting forth an amendment to the composite
certificate of incorporation of the Dow Chemical Company that the
company shall not make napalm.
Id.
As originally submitted, the proposal would have forbidden Dow to sell napalm
to any buyer who did not give assurance that the product would not be used against
human beings. The change was made because a better case could be made for manu-
facture than for sale as a proper subject for shareholder action. Id. at 662-63. Both
versions were cast in the form of requests, presumably in order to avoid the opera-
tion of the "proper subject exclusion." Notes 27 & 65 and accompanying text infra.
8This procedure is required by 17 C.F.R. § 24014a-8(d) (1970). The proposal was
objected to as dealing with general social and political matters, and also as relating
to Dow's ordinary business operations. For discussion of these objections see notes
25-72 and accompanying text infra.
9The SEC's regulations provide for discretionary review by the Commission of
an "informal" staff determination of the kind made here by the Division of Corpor-
ate Finance. 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1970). It has been held that a petitioner must ex-
haust his administrative remedies by seeking such review before bringing a private
action to enforce Rule 14a-8. Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y.
195).
"0452 F.2d at 663.
'15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1964). Section 25(a) of the Act provides that:
Any person aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in a
proceeding under this chapter to which such person is a party may
obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals
within any circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal
place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after
the entry of such order, a written petition praying that the order
CASE COMMENTS
In its briefs and oral argument before the circuit court, the Com-
mission refused to discuss the merits of its decision not to compel in-
clusion of the contested proposal, but confined itself to a strong attack
on the court's jurisdiction to review its action.12 Circuit Judge Tamm,
writing for the court, devoted the greater part of his opinion to an
exhaustive analysis of the jurisdictional question. The Commission
had contended that the procedures which it uses in deciding whether to
compel inclusion of a given proposal are informal in nature' 3 and have
been assumed not to be subject to judicial review.14 The court held,
however, that the adversary background of the Commission's decision
in this case was sufficient to differentiate it from the usual informal
proceeding and make it reviewable. 15 The SEC's contention that the de-
cision whether to compel inclusion of a shareholder proposal is a
matter within its prosecutorial function, and hence "committed to
agency discretion by law,"'16 was similarly rejected.17
Since the Commission had declined to articulate the reasoning
which led it to dispose of the anti-napalm resolution as it did,' s the
court remanded the case for construction of a record on the sub-
stantive points involved. "In aid of this consideration on remand,"
however, it confessed its "puzzlement" at the result reached by the
agency' 9 and set out its ex parte interpretation of the two exclusions
from the coverage of Rule 14a-8 relied on by Dow as justifying the
omission of the proposal.2 0
of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part....
[S~uch court shall have jurisdiction . . . to affirm, modify and
enforce or set aside such order, in whole or in part.
"-Brief for Respondent at 2. The Commission had originally raised the jurisdic-
tional issue by a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the court on October 13,
1969, "without prejudice to renewal thereof in the briefs and at the argument on the
merits." 432 F.2d at 663. (Circuit Judge Tamm, who wrote the opinion in the present
case, voted to grant the motion. Brief for Petitioner at 13.) Including its petition for
rehearing, the Commission filed six briefs and memoranda without ever discussing
the merits. Petitioner's Response to Supplementary Memorandum of the SEC at i.
"17 CF.R. §§ 202.1-202.7 (1970).
1 Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder Proposal Rule: A Decade Later, 40
NOTRE DAnE LAw. 13, 17 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Clusserath].
15432 F.2d at 667-70.
"5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (Supp. V 1965-69).
IrThe court said that this contention was meritorious, "but only in a limited
sense; and the decisions of this court have never allowed the phrase 'prosecutorial
discretion' to be treated as a magical incantation which automatically provides a
shield for arbitrariness." 432 F.2d at 673. The court conceded that the Commission
had discretion to allocate its limited resources of time and manpower as it saw
fit, but held that where the agency based its decision not to prosecute on a conclu-
sion of law, that conclusion was subject to review. Id. at 674-75.
"Note 12 supra.
'9432 F.2d at 676.
2id. at 676-8q,
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Any attempt to assess the correctness of the court's interpretation
of the shareholder proposal rule is handicapped by the fact that the
Commission has seldom articulated the basis for its decisions in this
area.21 As a former Commission attorney has said in criticizing this
practice:
Often, management will throw the whole book of objections at
a particular stockholder proposal, and later the staffs letter to
both concerned parties will only inform them that the Division
or Commission will raise no objection if management omits the
stockholder proposal from its proxy material.... Such general,
uninformative statements are often of no aid to the stockholder
concerned... 22
Presumably, the principles upon which the decision as to whether a
given proposal meets the standards for inclusion are discussed within
the agency; but the memoranda and minutes of Commission meetings
which might reflect these discussions are considered "nonpublic" and
are not normally made available to outsiders.23
Nevertheless, published surveys of proposals which the SEC has
permitted management to omit in the past, together with commentaries
on the operation of the shareholder proposal rule written by employees
and former employees of the Commission, 24 suggest some tentative con-
clusions regarding the interpretation placed on the rule by the agency.
On the basis of this material, it would appear that the Commission can
put forward a plausible argument that in light of its past construction
of Rule 14a-8, Dow's objections to the Medical Committee proposal
were sound.
The company had contended that the resolution could properly be
omitted under either subparagraph (2) or subparagraph (5) of Rule
14a-8(c), the relevant portions of which are as follows:
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the management may
-"Letter from Harvey L. Pitt, SEC Staff Attorney, to Washington & Lee Law
Review, October 13, 1970.
"Clusserath at 43.
=17 C.F.R. § 200.80(c)(5) (1970). The Commission is presently considering a
request that it make available minutes of all meetings since 1964 dealing with Rule
i4a-8. Letter from Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 21.
'1E.g., 2 L. Loss, SECURTmS REGULATION 900-15 (2d ed. 1961) (former Associate
General Counsel); 'Heller, Stockholder Proposals, 4 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA Compila-
tion 72 (1953) (then Assistant Director of the Division of Corporate Finance); Ledes,
A Review of Proper Subject Under the Proxy Rules, 34 U. DEr. L.J. 520 (1957) (then
Legal Assistant to Commissioner James C. Sargent); Clusserath (former Staff At-
torney). The Commission routinely disclaims responsibility for private publications
by its employees but these comments are presumably entitled to some weight due
to the authors' familiarity with Commission practice.
CASE COMMENTS
omit a proposal and any statement in support thereof from
its proxy statement and form of proxy under any of the follow-
ing circumstances:
(2) If it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by
the security holder... primarily for the purpose of promoting
general economic, political, racial, religious, social or simliar
causes;25 or
(5) If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request
that the management take action with respect to a matter relat-
ing to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the
issuer.2 6
The court interpreted the political exclusion as little more than a
gloss on the requirement that the proposal relate to a proper subject for
action by security holders.27 It read the word "general" in subpara-
graph (2) as ruling out attempts to secure a consensus of shareholder
opinion on political issues whose resolution is not within the corporate
power, and distinguished the Medical Committee's proposal as relating
"solely to a matter that is completely within the accepted sphere of
corporate activity and control." 28 This construction was supported by
the decision of the Director of the Division of Corporate Finance, is-
sued in 1945, which first introduced the political exclusion principle.
Replying to a request for advice from an unidentified corporation,29
the Director gave his opinion that resolutions opposing double taxa-
tion of dividend income, advocating revision of the antitrust laws, and
calling for equality of representation for investors with farmers and
workers could be omitted as failing to meet the proper subject require-
ment:
It was not the intent of [the shareholder proposal rule] to permit
stockholders to obtain the consensus of other stockholders with
respect to matters which are of a general political, social or eco-
-Hereinafter eferred to as the political exclusion.
"Hereinafter referred to as the ordinary business operations exclusion. 17 C.F.R.
§ 24o.14a-8(c) (197o).
-This requirement (hereinafter referred to as the proper subject exclusion)
was contained in the original version of the shareholder proposal rule and was then
the only limitation on management's duty to include a proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 24o.14a-7
(Cum. Supp. 1943). The present language allows management to omit a proposal if
it is "under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper subject for action by secur-
ity holders .. ." 17 C.F.RL § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (197o).
15432 F.2d at 681.
WVhile an opinion of this type is not binding on the Commission, it "can be
relied upon as representing the views" of the Division of Corporate Finance. 17
C.F.R. § 2o2.,(d) (,97o).
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nomic nature. Other forums exist for the presentation of such
views. 0
Subsequent application of the political exclusion rule by the Com-
mission staff suggests, however, that if this was its original construc-
tion, it has since been abandoned. In 1951, a proposal recommending
that the Greyhound Corporation consider the advisability of abolish-
ing segregated seating in the South was ruled out of order by the Divi-
sion of Corporate Finance.31 This holding was explained by comment-
ators on the grounds that the proposal did not show on its face that it
was restricted to the company's busses,3 2 and that state laws, then
thought valid with respect to intrastate transportation, required segre-
gation.3
3
It would seem, however, that these objections do not satisfactorily
explain the result in the Greyhound case in view of the fact that the
anti-segregation proposal could readily have been amended to elimi-
nate them.3 4 The decision is more easily justified if it is postulated
that the test applied by the Division was whether the motive of the
proponent was political or social in nature, rather than whether the
proposal was germane to corporate affairs.3 5 That this was in fact the
reason for the exclusion of the proposal is suggested by the language
used when the political exclusion was codified in the following year.86
The codified rule bars proposals put forward "for the purpose of pro-
moting" the designated causes, 37 a phrase which was not used in the
original formulation38 and whose significance the court in the present
case seems to have overlooked.
31432 F.2d at 677, citing Brief for Petitioner at Addendum 3. For an interpreta-
tion of the political exclusion consistent with that contained in the present opinion
see Emerson & Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly,
19 U. Cm. L. REv. 807, 834 (1952).
"'The stockholder's suit in district court to enjoin Greyhound from mailing its
proxy solicitations without the proposal was dismissed on the ground that plaintiff
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F.
Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); note 9 supra.
3'Emerson & Latcham, supra note 3o, at 833.
3id.; Note, Rule X-i 4 A-8 of the SEC: Stockholder Participation in Corporate
Affairs, 47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 718, 719 (1952). The court in Medical Committee also
cited these factors in distinguishing the Greyhound ruling. 432 F.2d at 678.
34The Commission will normally permit minor amendments in order to render
a shareholder proposal acceptable. Clusserath at 31; note 54 and accompanying text
infra.
35Note, Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 846 (1961).
3eSec. Ex. Act. Rel. 4775 (1952). The language adopted at that time was identical
to the present Rule 14a-8(c)(2). Text accompanying note 25 supra.
2"Note 25 and accompanying text supra (emphasis added).
"Note 3o and accompanying text supra.
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This alternative interpretation is supported by other instances in
which the political exclusion has been held to apply. In 195 3 , the As-
sistant Director of the Division of Corporate Finance, writing in his
private capacity, referred to Commission exclusion of proposals that a
corporation cease to invest in liquor stocks and that women be afforded
the same pension benefits as men.39 In explaining these decisions, the
Assistant Director said that
Although the purposes appeared germane to the business of the
company, on the facts the Commission determined that the pri-
mary motive of the stockholder was the advancement of the
cause with which the stockholder had a close association, rather
than the solution of a problem pertinent solely to the corpora-
tion itself.4 0
Another source reports exclusion of proposals that RCA refrain
from hiring Communists and former Communists and that "all em-
ployees be informed that it is to be [Standard Oil of New Jersey's]
policy to hire all personnel without regard to race, religion or national
origin." 4' Whatever the merits of these proposals, it would seem that
they were all as much "within the accepted sphere of corporate activity
and control"42 as the Medical Committee's anti-napalm resolution. As
applied by the Commission, then, the political exclusion would appear
to bar any shareholder proposal, whatever its relevance to the affairs of
the company, which is motivated by concern for social or political
issues.
A recent decision by the full Commission suggests, however, that the
scope of the political exclusion is not as broad in practice as might ap-
pear from the preceding discussion. This decision arose out of "Cam-
paign GM," the recent effort by associates of consumer advocate Ralph
Nader to compel General Motors, through shareholder action at the
company's 197o annual meeting, to be more responsive to social issues.43
As part of this movement, Campaign GM submitted nine proposals for
inclusion in GM's proxy statement,44 all of which were objected to by
SHeller, Stockholder Proposals, 4 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA Compilation 72, 74
(1953).
'Id. This explanation referred also to the Greyhound case, note 31-35 and ac-
companying text supra.
"Bayne, The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U. DEr. L.J. 575, 599 (1957).
"Note 28 supra.
"See, e.g., THE NEw YoRxER, June 20, 197o, at 4o; T mE, June 1, 197o, at 54-55.
"Proposal number one directed an amendment to GM's certificate of incorpora-
tion to prevent the company from taking any action which would be illegal or detri-
mental to public health, safety, or welfare.
Proposal number two would have increased the size of the board of directors.
Proposal number three would have established a Shareholders Committee for
19711
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management on several grounds, including both the political and ordi-
nary business operations exclusions.
45
If the motivation behind the proposals was considered, it would ap-
pear that all nine, regardless of their subject matter, should have been
equally unacceptable in view of the avowed purpose of their proponents
to bring about social change. 46 Both the Division of Corporate Finance
and the Office of the General Counsel of the Commission were of the
opinion, however, that proposal number two, which called for enlarge-
ment of the board of directors, did not fall under the political exclu-
sion and should be included in the company's proxy statement.47 The
full Commission adopted this position.
48
The eight remaining Campaign GM proposals produced disagree-
ment between the Division and the Office of the General Counsel. The
Division felt that all eight could be omitted, based in part upon the
political exclusion. 49 The General Counsel, while agreeing that pro-
posal number one and numbers four through nine did not meet the
standards for inclusion,5 0 was evidently of the opinion that the political
exclusion did not apply to any of the proposals. 51 It recommended that
proposal number three, which called for the establishment of a "Share-
holders Committee for Corporate Responsibility" to study and report
Corporate Responsibility to study and report on GM's relationship to specified
social problems.
Proposal number four called for a commitment by the company to an increased
role for public mass transportation.
Proposal number five would have set specific crash-safety standards for GM
automobiles.
Proposal number six directed commitment of corporate resources to control of
vehicle emissions.
Proposal number seven called for greatly increased warranty coverage on the
company's products.
Proposal number eight would have required controls on internal air pollution
in GM plants.
Proposal number nine called for "immediate and effective action" to increase
minority representation among franchise holders and skilled and managerial em-
ployees. Minute of a Meeting of the SEC, March 18, 197o, at 15-2o (hereinafter cited
as Minute).
"Id. at io-ii.




5"The basis of the Office of the General Counsel's objections does not appear in
the Minute.
5The language of the Minute is ambiguous on this point: "Office [of the Gen-
eral Counsel] did not agree with GM or the Division that all of the proposals (ex-
cept for the Division's position on proposal 2) might be omitted pursuant to Rule
14a-8(c)(2)." Minute at 12.
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on GM's relation to specified social issues,5 2 be included in the manage-
ment's proxy material. When the question came before the Commis-
sion, it voted, with one dissent, to compel inclusion of this proposal if
it were revised to restrict the proposed Committee's budget to a rea-
sonable sum and to prevent disclosure of trade secrets.5 3 It determined
that no action would be taken if GM omitted the remaining seven pro-
posals, but did not state whether its holding rested on the political
exclusion.
5 4
Neither the construction placed on the political exclusion by the
court in the principal case5 5 nor the straightforward test of motive ap-
parently used by the Division of Corporate Finance in the past56 seem
adequate to explain the stand taken by the Division with regard to the
Campaign GM proposals. The eight resolutions which the Division re-
jected were no less relevant to corporate concerns than the proposal to
increase the size of the board. Nor is there anything to indicate that the
motive of the approved proposal was any different from that of the
others. Unlike the rejected proposals (and like the Medical Commit-
tee's resolution), the accepted proposal did not show its social motiva-
tion on its face, but such a distinction hardly seems adequate to ac-
count for the difference in treatment. Perhaps a better explanation for
the Division's position is provided by the fact that the size of the board
has in the past been considered an accepted subject for shareholder
action.5 7 The Division may have refrained from a rigorous inquiry into
the motive underlying this proposal in order to avoid the appearance
of pro-management bias.
On the other hand, the position taken by the Office of the General
Counsel, and endorsed by the Commission at least with respect to pro-
posal number three, may indicate a retreat from the test of motive and
perhaps from the political exclusion itself.58 The Commission's deci-
sion, that the proposal was not properly excludible, would seem funda-
mentally inconsistent with the position taken by the Division of Cor-
porate Finance since the Greyhound ruling.59 This holding suggests




r"Note 28 and accompanying text supra.
WNotes 35-42 and accompanying text supra.
7GCusserath at 48.
rsIt should be noted that the majority of the decisions applying the stockholder
proposal rule are made by the Division and not by the full Commission. 17 C.F.R.
§ .o2.1(d) (197o); Clusserath, supra note 14, at 17.
r3Note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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the Commission's rejection of the Medical Committee's proposal may
have rested chiefly on the ordinary business operations exclusion.6 0
The court in Medical Committee, on the contrary, had considerably
less difficulty in dismissing the ordinary business operations exclusion
than in dealing with the political exclusion. Referring to the law of
Dow's state of incorporation, 6' the circuit court found that since Dela-
ware's General Corporation Law permits amendment of the certificate
of incorporation to change the nature of the company's business, the
anti-napalm resolution was clearly within the sphere of shareholder
action.62 While this might be a valid conclusion with respect to the
extent of the shareholder's power, 3 it does not appear to meet the
question presented by the ordinary business operations exclusion.
Like the political exclusion, the ordinary business operations ex-
clusion grew out of the interpretation of the original shareholder pro-
posal rule, whose only limitation was that the proposal must relate to a
proper subject for shareholder action.64 Soon after the rule was adopted,
the Commission developed the principle that while the shareholders
could not demand that management act with regard to any matter
which state law reserved for the directors, a request that the board con-
sider taking action might be acceptable.65 When the composition of the
SEC changed following the election of President Eisenhower, the new
Commission apparently felt that restrictions on shareholder proposals
°°Note 26 and accompanying text supra.
OtAs with the proper subject exclusion, state law governs as to whether a pro-
posal relates to ordinary business operations. Hearings on SEC Enforcement Problems
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 85 th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. i at 18 (1957). Professor Loss suggests, however, that state law is
frequently inadequate to decide the question and that the Commission has developed
a "common law" in this area. 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrms REULATioN 905-06 (2d ed. 1961).
2432 F.2d 68o. The court cited DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 242(a) (Supp. 1968):
(a) [A] corporation may amend its certificate of incorporation, from
time to time, so as:
(2) To change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of its
business or its corporate powers and purposes.
nNote 65 infra.
"Note 27 supra.
62 L Loss, supra note 61, at 9o8; CARY, CORPORATIONS 329-30 (4 th ed. 1969).
During the Commission's 1956 fiscal year, a stockholder of Interstate Department
Stores, Inc. put forward a proposal calling for a two-for-one stock split. Such action
would have required an amendment to the certificate of incorporation. Under the
same Delaware statute that applied to the present case, the amendment had to be
initiated by the directors and approved by the shareholders. The Commission staff
took the position that the proposal would be proper if put in the form of a request.
Ledes, A Review of Proper Subject Under the Proxy Rules, 34 U. DL:r. L.J. 520, 525-
27 (1957).
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should be tightened somewhat.60 When in 1954 it amended Rule 14a-8
to provide these tighter controls,67 it adopted the ordinary business
operations exclusion as an absolute prohibition on shareholder initia-
tive, however phrased, in the operational area of corporate activity.68
The court's conclusion in Medical Committee that the shareholders
have the power to recommend that Dow cease to manufacture napalm,
thus fails to meet the objection raised by management to the Medical
Committee's resolution. The point at issue is whether the decision to
make napalm is a matter of "ordinary business operations." Unfor-
tunately, the Commission has never provided a clear definition of this
term. 0 However, the word "ordinary" apparently refers to the area of
operations involved, barring any shareholder proposal in that area
whatever the importance of the particular action advocated or chal-
lenged.70 The field of production is seemingly such an area. In the
Campaign GM case, an attempt by the dissident shareholders to exer-
cise control over the specifications of the company's products71 was ap-
parently rejected as falling within the ordinary business operations ex-
clusion. This action was consistent with the result reached in an
earlier attempt to restrict the size and speed of a corporation's pro-
ducts.72
The Commission can thus make out a persuasive case with respect
to both exclusions that it followed a consistent interpretation of its own
rules in acquiescing in Dow's decision to omit the anti-napalm pro-
posal. Furthermore, if the holding of the Supreme Court in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 73 is taken at its face value, this consistency of
interpretation would appear to dispose of the present case. In Seminole,
the Office of Price Administration charged the defendant company with
violating a price regulation. The company challenged the applicability
61L. Loss, supra note 6i at 912.
6See Bayne, Caplin, Emerson & Latcham, supra note 2.
0OIn the words of an unidentified Commissioner, speaking at a Commission
meeting in 1964, the adoption of the ordinary business operations exclusion repre-
sented
recognition of the view that proposals which would be considered
improper as directives are proper in precatory form under para-
graph (c)(i) and may be excluded from management's proxy ma-
terial only if some other provision of the rule so requires.
CARY, supra note 65, at 330.
WOne commentator has suggested that the Commission uses the ordinary busi-
ness operations exclusion as a "catch-all concept of omissibility." Note, Corporate
Political Affairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 848 (1961).
70Clusserath at 36 (citing a decision of the Division of Corporate Finance).
7'Note 44 supra.
7-Clusserath at 29.
7325 US. 410 (1945).
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of the regulation to the transaction involved. In rejecting the challenge,
the Court held:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regula-
tion a court must necessarily look to the administrative construc-
tion of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in
doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Con-
stitution may be relevant in the first instance in choosing be-
tween various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.74
This holding has been cited repeatedly by the Supreme Court75 and
by the lower federal courts. 76 The principle which it embodies has been
applied with particular force to the SEC proxy rules.7 7 Numerous pri-
vate actions to enforce compliance with the rules have been unsuccess-
ful largely because of the failure of the Commission to proceed against
the alleged violator, not only where the agency has given full considera-
tion to the case and found no infraction, 78 but also where it has merely
taken no action with respect to the challenged material. 79
Nonetheless, this principle of construction, although often repeated,
does not remove the courts' discretion to decline to follow the admini-
strative interpretation in a case where the equities of the situation seem
to urge a contrary result.8 0 For example, in M. Kraus & Bros. v. United
W
4
d. at 413-14 (emphasis added).
75E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969);
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S.
1, 4 (1965).
7'E.g., Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533 (0o th Cir. 1968); Jno. McCall Coal Co. v.
United States, 374 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1967); Wright v. Paine, 289 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir.
1961); L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co., 169 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1948). In the
Jno. McCall Coal Co. case -the court stated:
Even though our views with regard to interpretation differ from
those of the administrative agency we would not be authorized to
substitute our views if it could be said that the administrative inter-
pretation was a reasonable one.
374 F.2d at 692.
"7Dyer v. SEC, 290 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1961); Dyer v. SEC, 289 F.zd 242 (8th Cir.
1961); Dyer v. SEC, 287 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1961); Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1959).
'E.g., Union Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill.
1964); Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
'*E.g., Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Weeks v. Alpert, 131
F. Supp. 6o8 (D. Mass. 1955). This judicial reluctance to find a violation of the proxy
rules where the Commission has found none was partially relied on by the court in
the present case to support its holding that the Medical Committee was aggrieved
by the agency's refusal to act against Dow. 432 F.2d at 667.
8°As one of the leading authorities on administrative law has said:
When the court agrees with the rule, that is, when it finds the rule
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States,8l decided the year after Seminole, the Supreme Court simply
ignored its holding in that case. Possibly influenced by the fact that
to hold the administrative interpretation valid would have subjected
the defendant to criminal penalties, it held that the language of the
regulation in question did not clearly warrant the interpretation.82 In
Pike v. CAB,s 3 the circuit court refused to sustain the agency's revoca-
tion of a commercial pilot's license on the basis of a regulation found
to be vague and confusing.8 4
While it should be emphasized that the court in Medical Committee
had heard only one side of the argument,8 5 the strength of its disagree-
ment with the Commission's presumed position suggests that the con-
sistency of the agency's decision in this case with its prior construction
of Rule 14a-8 would fail to convince the court that the anti-napalm
resolution was properly excluded. Its evident unwillingness to be
bound by the SEC's interpretation may stem in part from published
criticism of the agency for alleged inconsistent administration, poor
substantive law, and failure to provide adequate information as to the
reasoning behind its application of the shareholder proposal rule.86
The court seems also to have been impressed by the Medical Commit-
tee's argument that since Dow's management had arrived at its decision
to go on manufacturing napalm, which it conceded might be damaging
to the company, on political and moral grounds,8 7 the result of the
Commission's interpretation was a double standard as to the propriety
of political activity by shareholders and management.88
a sound interpretation of the statute or a proper determination
under the statute, the court is likely to utter words that the regula-
tion is controlling, that it has great weight, or .that it must be given
effect unless it is unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute.
When the court disagrees, that is, when the court thinks the regula-
tion is inconsistent with the statute or unauthorized by it, or when
the policy embodied in the regulation is neither required nor pro-
hibited by the statute and the court prefers a different policy, the
court is likely to say that such a regulation is void and of no effect.
i K. DAVIS, ADiMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.05 (1958).
32327 U.S. 614 (1946).
1id. at 622; see 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.12 (1958).
'33o3 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1962).
"The court also distinguished Seminole on the ground that the precise point
raised in Pike had never before been decided by the agency: "Administrative inter-
pretation of long standing is thus not present." 303 F.2d at 357 (emphasis added).
'Note 12 and accompanying text supra.
6'Clusserath at 39-42. The court cited this article in support of its assumption
of jurisdiction. 432 F.2d at 674.
b"In its argument before the Commission, the Medical Committee had introduced
in evidence a statement by Dow's president in the company magazine in which this
admission was made. Record at 4oa-43a.
0432 F.2d at 681.
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It appears likely that the SEC will be compelled to lower somewhat
its barriers against politically or socially motivated attempts by share-
holders to influence corporate decision-making concerning the nature
of the products to be manufactured. Such a development would repre-
sent a more realistic appraisal of the role of the corporation in modem
society than that which evidently underlies the political and ordinary
business operations exclusions as they have been applied by the Com-
mission.
The Commission's approach seemingly rests on the assumption that
it is not only desirable but also necessary for a corporation to go about
its operations in a political vacuum, without any concern for the ef-
fects of its activities beyond its balance sheet. If this view is accepted,
any attempt by a shareholder to inject social considerations into corpor-
ate decision-making, or to interfere with the highly technical process of
making money, becomes an evil to be avoided. The court in Medical
Committee, on the other hand, has recognized that large corporations
frequently use their enormous and concentrated power for political
ends.8 9 In light of this fact, a rule which allows management, but not
shareholders, to dictate the employment of corporate resources "for the
purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious,
social or similar causes" 00-as Dow's management had done in deciding
to go on manufacturing napalm9l-is manifestly inequitable.
The second position taken by Dow, and apparently endorsed by the
Commission, that the decision as to what products the company shall
make is wholly outside the legitimate area of shareholder concern,92 is
similarly untenable. A strong case can certainly be made that this is a
field in which management's expertise should, under normal circum-
stances, be unhampered by shareholder interference. But to derive from
this an absolute prohibition on shareholder initiative in cases like the
present one is to ignore the fact that the decision to manufacture
napalm, charged as it is with moral considerations in the eyes of a
large segment of society, is one which cannot be called "ordinary" in
any realistic sense of the word.
It is not to be assumed that shareholders will take a more responsible
position than management on social issues. Indeed, the reverse may
well be true.93 However, the very limited check on the power of man-
agement which would be provided by more liberal interpretation of
'Id.
D0i7 C.F.R. § 2404a-8(c)(2) (1970).
O1Note 87 supra.
0432 F.2d at 679.
"See Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 5o B.U.L. REv.
157, 177 n.a18 (i97o)
